### DEPARTMENT OF STATE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

G/PM

SECRET

November 3, 1962

**HEMORANDUM** 

TO:

G - U. Alexis Johnson

FROM:

G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen

SUBJECT:

Quadripartite Ambassadorial Meeting

1. An Ambassadorial Meeting was called for this afternoon for the purpose of briefing the British, French and Germans on Cuban developments.

2. Sy reports that not only was a very active interest displayed in how events were going, but there seemed to be an implication of Allied interest in seeing the US follow through effectively. Asked a number of questions about the extent to which we were receiving satisfaction from the Russians in our efforts to get them to accept the letter of the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. He wondered, for example, whether the Russians were "taking cover behind Castro" and expressed approval when told that we were trying not to let them get away with this. He said that it was important for the US to follow through effectively because of the significance of the precedent which this would set in future conflicts which could be expected with the Soviets (he was presumably thinking primarily of renewed Berlin pressures).

pressed very hard on the extent to which we were gaining satisfaction on the question of inspection.

Government had been receiving daily reports from its Embassy in Havana giving detailed accounts of movement of military equipment into caves and of otherwise suspicious goings-on. Paul Nitze asked if this information was being communicated to the US and assured him that all of the information was promptly being turned over. The Ambassador went on to ask whether we had found any corroboratory evidence to support the charges. He was told that we had not despite what we felt was an effective air surveillance. Nevertheless, it was conceded that this would leave something to be desired.

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3. How much the exchange of views effectively reflected British, French and German governmental positions, we, of course, cannot say. However, insofar as our interpretation of the Ambassadors' attitudes is a correct one, it would seem to substantiate our feeling that the vigor of the US follow through is being carefully observed by friend as well as foe. In any event, Ambassador Thompson assured the group that the US was continuing to press home its insistence upon acceptable inspection as contemplated in the President's exchange with Khrushchev.

cc: G/PM - Mr. Garthoff Col. Magathan

## **EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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cc: G/PM - Mr. Garthoff Col. Magathan

G/PM/Weiss/vl

KERTHANDERSON MATCHEN MERINAMEN